A report released by the Chief Inspector of Prisons Anne Owers, has some very strong criticisms of the detention estate. Below NCADC have extracted some of the more salient points.

Download the summary in PDF format: Detention estate report.pdf

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Inspection of five Immigration Service custodial establishments by Anne Owers Chief Inspectorate of Prisons.

Haslar - Lindholme - Campsfield House - Tynsley House - Oakington

The inspection of removal centres involve four tests which we consider determine whether overall they provide a healthy environment. They are:

• that detainees are held in safety;

• that they are treated with respect;

• that they are purposefully occupied during the day;

• that they are able to keep in contact with the outside world and are prepared for their release, transfer or removal.

General observations:

1.6 Perceptions of safety were not, therefore, high anywhere: only 37% of detainees overall told us they felt safe and at all the establishments except Oakington the proportion reporting feeling safe decreased the longer they were held there.

However, it is evident that detainees felt particularly unsafe in the two Prison Service run Centres. Only 10% of those at Haslar, and 15% of those held in Lindholme told us they felt safe after some time there. At Lindholme there were low staffing levels, particularly at night.

At Haslar the physical environment was unsafe and unsatisfactory. Many detainees were in dormitories that were cubicles without doors and with gaps between the walls and the ceilings, and there was nowhere to isolate difficult or disturbed individuals. By contrast, two thirds of those held in Oakington initially felt safe, and this rose to three-quarters after some time there.

1.8 For detainees in all centres, though, except for Oakington, their insecurity was heightened by the fact that they were unable to obtain reliable information from the immigration authorities about the reasons for their detention or the progress of their cases, or to access competent independent legal advice. For many, this was the greatest insecurity of all. From the surveys, it was clear that reviews of detention, if they took place, were not effectively communicated to detainees. From the inspections it became clear that immigration officers on site did not know, and did not communicate, how cases were progressing: nor was it evident to us that they were progressed efficiently. The case studies in the reports include cases where detainees were unable to return home when they wished to, as well as those wishing to challenge their removal.

1.9 Nor were detainees easily able to obtain competent independent legal advice to explain their situation or represent them; indeed, in a number of centres they were clearly targeted by unscrupulous advisers who were able to prey on their vulnerability.

1.11 Perceptions of safety were clearly linked to perceptions of respect, and the standard of custodial care. Detainees at Oakington talked of the positive attitude of staff "they treat us as equals" and the high standard of custodial care: 72% said that staff had asked after them in their first few days. Groups of detainees at Lindholme and Haslar, however, complained of staff attitudes. 81% of those at Lindholme and 82% at Haslar said that no member of staff had asked after them. At the other two centres, responses were more mixed, with few complaints at Tinsley House, but more at Campsfield House.

1.12 It is, however, clear that staff in most centres were not sufficiently alert to, or trained in, the specific needs of immigration detainees. Again, this was particularly apparent in the two Prison Service establishments, where both the attitudes of staff and the procedures adopted were geared towards offenders.

1.13 . . . . . . Tinsley House appeared to consider that race and ethnic relations were the province of the religious affairs manager, rather than the responsibility of the Centre as a whole.

1.14 The provision of interpreters and translated information for those who did not speak English was poor in all the centres except Oakington. Other detainees were used in this role, which was appropriate for domestic matters, but not for important and sensitive interviews. Our surveys indicated that about two-thirds understood spoken English and about half written English, and that Language Line was insufficiently exploited. Significant proportions of detainees did not understand why they were being held in detention, the rules and routines of the centres, or what the centre doctor or their legal representatives had said to them.

1.15 A major cause for concern, at all centres, was the absence of any specific provision to deal with the welfare needs and anxieties of those who had suddenly, and sometimes after extended periods of residence in the UK, found themselves detained indefinitely. Many had been abruptly separated from families who were culturally unprepared to deal directly with the outside world. Others had possessions and homes that they had left behind and to which they might not return.

1.16 Healthcare, and particularly mental health care, was an issue in most centres. Communication between centres and with community health services who had provided, or would go on to provide, treatment was often poor.

1.22 . . . . Both Prison Service centres (Haslar & Dover), at the time of the inspection, still randomly strip-searched detainees after visits, rather than as a result of reasonable suspicion. This was unacceptable and unnecessary.

1.25 After detention, many detainees will be removed to their countries of origin. Others will be transferred to other places of detention. Some will be released into the community, permanently or temporarily, some for the first time and some to take up their lives again. These decisions are made by the immigration authorities; and detainees need advance notice and preparation for these major moves. We found little evidence that this was provided in any centre. Indeed, in some, officials told us that they withheld information about removal or continued detention from some detainees until the last moment. In some cases, this meant that they were unable even to inform families and legal representatives of their removal from the country. These hurried, and sometimes deceptive, arrangements were apparently designed to minimise security and self-harm risks. However, we consider that those risks should be managed properly, rather than evaded or passed on to the next centre. We point out that if detainees are not properly prepared for removal, they are more, not less, likely to create security and control problems at the point of departure. The provision of independent welfare advice (see para.1.15 above) would assist in dealing with practical problems.

Conclusions on individual establishments:

Lindholme: The outcome of our inspection and the application of our four tests lead us to conclude that Lindholme Removal Centre was not a healthy establishment for detainees and that fundamental and far-reaching changes were needed to bring it up to the standard expected.

Haslar: We concluded that Haslar did not do enough to help detainees settle and to provide them with an environment in which they were safe. Staff were disengaged, the quality of the accommodation was poor, and incentive and anti-bullying schemes based on prison practice were inappropriate. The lack of information about their cases, the restricted visiting times and the failure to receive detainees’ property all communicated disrespect. Detainees were underoccupied, despite the best efforts of Centre staff. Contact with the outside world and preparation for release were also inadequately provided for.

Campsfield House: We could not conclude that Campsfield House was a place of safety, mainly because of poor levels of supervision and despite the best efforts of most staff. Detainees were however treated with respect in terms of the quality of custodial care, health care and pastoral care they received. However, there was a blindness to their welfare needs outside, and a lack of information about their cases or access to competent independent advice and representation. Detainees were however professionally served in terms of activities and entertainment within the limits of a regime that did not allow paid work, but they were inadequately prepared for their release, transfer or removal.

Tynsley House: The application of these four tests indicate that Tinsley House was essentially a place of safety where detainees experienced a good standard of custodial care. They were treated with respect and provided with adequate health care and opportunities to practise their religion, engage in constructive activities and to retain contact with the outside world. However, their security was undermined by the fact that they were not easily able to find out about the progress of their cases, receive help with external welfare needs or access specialist legal advice or representation. They were not prepared for their release, transfer or removal and there was a form of institutional blindness to the practical difficulties caused by detention and to the fate of many after release.

Oakington: The application of these four tests indicated that Oakington was essentially a place of safety providing a high standard of custodial care. The needs and dignity of detainees were respected by Centre staff, except for the splitting of families during and after detention, and within the limits of a fast and inflexible process. Unlike at other centres, there was access to on-site case information and legal representation, though there could be more structured activities, particularly for juveniles, and incentives to take part, in order to ease the tension associated with the serious business of the Centre. Arrangements for those leaving the Centre needed improvement. A forward destination and the means of travel were provided to those granted temporary admission, but they were given no support to orient to life in the UK. Those destined for further detention were not informed about this until the day of departure, and appeared to be unable at this stage to contact family, friends or legal representatives.

Strategic Recommendations

1. All removal centre staff must be trained in the specific issues that affect immigration detainees, and aware of the cultural, national and ethnic background from which they come

2. The Prison Service, if it is to hold detainees, must ensure that removal centre staff are specifically recruited for and designated to this function

3. Translated information should be available in all centres in the languages of detainees, and interpreters should be provided for important immigration meetings and sensitive medical matters.

4. Operating standards should ensure that relevant processes, and the appropriate staff training, are in place to deal with suicide, self-harm, anti-bullying and race and ethnic relations.

5. The detention of children should be avoided wherever possible, and only take place for the shortest possible time, in no case more than seven days.

6. Establishments holding children should have in place robust child protection safeguards and effective liaison with local Area Child Protection Committees.

7. The Immigration Service should ensure that the casework of those detained is expedited, and all detainees are kept informed, in a language they understand, about the reasons for their detention and its continuation and the progress of their cases. On-site immigration staff should be able to communicate up-to-date case information directly to detainees.

8. The Immigration Services Commissioner should pay particular attention to monitoring the quality of legal advice provided to detainees, who are an exceptionally vulnerable group; and information about properly regulated advisers should be available in all centres.

9. The Immigration and Nationality Department and the Legal Services Commission should consult with professional bodies to ensure that access to competent independent legal advice and representation is provided.

10. Protocols should be agreed for the release of medical information, with consent, to the immigration authorities and detainees’ representatives, if such information is relevant to fitness to detain or to the detainee’s asylum claim, and the action that should follow.

11. All removal centres should follow best practice in relation to visits and phone calls: allowing extended family and legal visits (including during the evening and at weekends) and issuing weekly a £5 phone allowance or phone cards to those without means. Consideration should be given to making e-mail facilities available to detainees.

12. Detainees who wish to do so should be allowed to undertake paid work while in detention; alternatively, or in the meantime, there should be incentives for participation in centre activities

13. Removal centres should have independent welfare support advisers, able to assist with family and home problems, and to advise and support detainees on release, transfer or removal.

14. Immigration and centre staff should give detainees adequate notice of any movements.

Source for this page: NCADC