Still Human Still Here (SHSH) is a “coalition of over 50 organisations that are campaigning to end the destitution of thousands of refused asylum seekers in the UK”. In June this year, they issued a commentary on the UKBA’s Operational Guidance Note (OGN) on Afghanistan. The commentary identifies inconsistencies and omissions between Afghanistan country of origin information (COI) and case law and the conclusions reached by the OGN.

NCADC volunteer Jacqueline has summarised the commentary on Afghanistan, with a particular focus on issues relevant to Afghan asylum-seekers in the UK. You can read the full text of SHSH’s commentary here.

Actors of protection

This section deals with the Afghan security forces and competence and willingness to protect potential victims of violence. The OGN accepts that security forces in rural areas outside of Kabul are structurally weak, however SHSH highlights that there are serious weaknesses which affect all Afghan security forces, even in Kabul. These include issues with vetting police officers (note that lack of vetting allows for insurgent infiltration), limited female officers, lack of accountability, corruption and weakness and bias of the judiciary.

SHSH go as far as saying “Given that these structural weaknesses affect the security forces in general, not just those areas outside of Kabul and other main cities, it is questionable whether effective protection would ever be accessible in Afghanistan”. The commentary points out that, while the OGN recognises the need to assess the willingness and ability of the authorities to provide protection on the individual facts of each claim, it does not address additional and relevant structural issues undermining police protection in Kabul.

Internal relocation

If it is considered that one area of a country is not safe for a deportee to be returned to, a common practice is that they will be “internally relocated” to a different, supposedly safer, area or town. The conclusion of the relevant section of the OGN considers that the situation for returnees to Kabul is “more favourable” than the situation for IDPs. However, it should be noted that the reintegration packages referred to the in the Country Guidance case discussed (AK) differ depending on whether a returnee is voluntarily returned or not – a returnee is given a greater financial advantage if they return voluntarily meaning that enforced returnees are at a greater risk of being destitute or unable to reintegrate upon arrival. This makes them more likely to end up living in life-threatening conditions.

The OGN also does not include COI on the ability of insurgents and anti-government groups to track down internally relocated persons. In addition, there is a lack of mental health treatment and psychological support, which is considered to be required for conflict-induced internally displaced persons who have often been traumatised by their experiences of violence or even the displacement itself. Less than five percent of IDPs report receiving any post-displacement counselling.

General security situation

Although the OGN includes excerpts of the most recent 2010 “UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan”, the UNHCR’s position on the security situation in Afghanistan has not been included.

The UNHCR Guidelines say:

[In] light of: (I) the worsening security environment in certain parts of the country; (ii) the increasing number of civilian casualties; and (iii) the significant population displacements, UNHCR considers that the situation in certain parts of Afghanistan…can be characterized as on of generalized violence at the time of writing. Additionally, the overall situation in Afghanistan has also been recognised by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as an internal armed conflict in accordance with the definitions and scope set out in Article 1(1) of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. More specifically, based on information known and available to UNHCR at the time of writing, the situation in Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar, and in parts of Ghazni and Khost provinces has reached such a high: (I) number of civilian casualties; (ii) frequency of security incidents; and (iii) number of persons displaced due to the armed conflict, that the situation is recognized by UNHCR as one of generalized violence. Therefore, Afghan asylum-seekers, formally residing in Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar, and in parts of Ghazni and Khost provinces may be in need of international protection under complementary forms of protection on the basis of a fear of serious and indiscriminate harm arising from the situation of generalized violence. Furthermore, in light of the: (I) sustained large-scale military operations in the southern region in Helmand and Kandahar provinces; (ii) the ensuing struggle for territorial control by parties to the conflict; and (iii) outbreaks of violence in previously unaffected areas, UNHCR considers that no internal flight or relocation alternative…is available in either of these two provinces.

Contrast this with the conclusion reached by the OGN:

3.9.15 Conclusion. A state of civil instability and/or where law and order has sometimes broken down does not of itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. The claimant must demonstrate a well-founded claim for asylum where he or she is at risk of persecution on Convention grounds. In addition, each case must also be considered under Article 15 (c) of the EU Qualification Directive/Immigration Rule 339C to ascertain whether the individual claimant would be at real risk of indiscriminate violence.
3.9.16 However whilst there is indiscriminate violence in some parts of Afghanistan, it is not currently at such a level in Afghanistan generally, or a material part of it, that substantial grounds exist for believing that any civilian would, solely by being present there, face a real risk of serious harm. Given the complexity and fluidity of the situation, asylum applications by Afghans claiming to flee generalized violence in parts of Afghanistan should each be assessed carefully, in light of the current country information specific to the profile of the applicant.

Comparing these extracts, it does not appear that the UKBA considers the security situation in Afghanistan to be as serious as it appears to be believed by UNHCR.

Locally engaged staff

SHSH commentary describes the COI included in the OGN as “broadly illustrative” of the situation of persons working for or perceived to be involved with the International Assistance Force, the Afghanistan Government or foreign agencies/employers and humanitarian agencies. However, the conclusion reached by the OGN says that “…in general the cessation of the employment, or relocation, will nullify the threat, unless there are specific factors which preclude this”. This conclusion does not specifically address the reasonableness of relocation for this profile. Furthermore the COI indicating that insurgents have the capability and willingness to track down high profile targets, even if after they have internally relocated, undermines the position taken in the OGN that leaving the employment in question would generally negate the threat.

Minors

The OGN includes a “Minors” section in the “Main categories of claim” section for the first time. This section includes limited COI on (i) the impact of the on-going violence on children; (ii) human rights abuses faced by children; and (iii) forced recruitment of children.

The impact of the on-going violence on children

The OGN states that:

The United Nations-led country task force on monitoring and reporting on children and armed conflict received 166 reports of incidents involving grave child rights violations from 1 November 2012 to 31 January 2013. A total of 79 deaths and 192 injuries to children were verified. Most were in the eastern and southern regions.

SHSH provides further sources which document the disproportionate impact of violence on children in Afghanistan as well as information on the situation of displaced children, the psychological and emotional impact on children and the availability of child mental health services. So while the OGN does take account of violence against children, it would appear that they do not give a full picture of the longer-term difficulties faced by children at risk of, or who have already experienced, violence.

Human rights abuses faced by children

The OGN recognises that “sexual abuse and violence against children, including at the hands of family members, is reportedly commonplace in Afghanistan” and touches on issues such as: (i) the practice of keeping young boys for sexual and social entertainment (Baccha Baazi); (ii) the under-reported nature of sexual abuse and violence against children; (iii) internal trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation, domestic servitude and forced labour.

SHSH provide further recent information kidnappings, trafficking, forced and early marriage, detention of girls for “moral crimes” including fleeing forced marriage, access to education, child labour and criminal justice system for minors and treatment of children in detention centres and prisons.

Forced recruitment of children

SHSH recognises that in the OGN, the general issue of forced recruitment is dealt with extensively in the main category of claim “Fear of the Taliban or other anti-government groups”. The OGN includes views of UNHCR and Amnesty International that highlight the importance of not defining “forced recruitment” narrowly, meaning that the full range of possible coercive recruitment strategies should be taken into account, including economics, fear, intimidation, pride and honour, religious persuasion and the use of tribal mechanisms to pressurise individuals into joining the Taliban, rather than by force.

The commentary provides further sources to give a fuller picture of this opinion and concludes that forced recruitment should not be considered as exceptional – this view is shared by UNHCR and Amnesty International.

SHSH is critical of the OGN’s concluding paragraph relating to forced recruitment of children which surmises that only in “exceptional” circumstances would individuals or families be directly approached and forced to join the Taliban or other armed anti-government groups. This conclusion “fails to take account of the information [quoted extensively in the commentary] and the opinions published by UNHCR and Amnesty International”.

The SHSH commentary does not attempt to come to a general conclusion about the reasonableness of the OGN, rather it simply highlights areas where the Guidance seems inconsistent or incomplete in relation to all of the COI and commentary available in the public domain. Operational Guidance Notes exist to provide a brief summary for use by UKBA decision-makers. It does not purport to be comprehensive and exists to provide context only. Nevertheless, it is important for this information to be accurate as it is a factor in making decisions whether to return people to Afghanistan, which remains a very dangerous country to live in.